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Introduction 
During the 1970s, global financial challenges including the failure of the Bretton-
Woods system and the world oil crisis brought into sharp focus the complex interplay of 
politics and economics. Attempts to better understand the intricacies of this relationship led to 
the emergence of the sub-field of international political economy (IPE). In a similar manner, 
the disruptive effect of information and communications technology (ICT) on international 
affairs has provided impetus for a more integrated inquiry into the connections between the 
fields of technology and politics. Working to better comprehend this complex relationship has 
highlighted the fact that some questions are not easily addressed by existing international 
relations theories and concepts.   
In seeking to better understand the relationship between state power and new 
technology, this paper focuses on the political history of the internet in America. Despite states’ 
increasing dependence and interdependence upon the global network, the political history of 
how this technology was initially conceived, developed, governed and managed over time is 
not adequately understood. Although “histories of the internet” abound, they are almost 
exclusively concerned with documenting key technicians and developers and attributing their 
achievements and contributions to the code and architecture now in use. However, the 
political forces surrounding those developments are rarely referenced in these accounts and 
given no substantive place in understanding the progression of the internet from a military 
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project to an open global network. Key enabling legislature, policy mandates, the role of the 
state in enabling or dissuading internet governance and the influence of governmental 
perceptions and intentions in shaping the technology are largely absent this work leaving an 
important aspect of the development and ongoing management of the internet unexamined. 
In designing this research project, it became apparent that existing international 
relations theories cannot provide an adequate framework for comprehending this multi-faceted 
and important issue. Although international relations has a range of theories about power, it 
has not yet developed a corresponding research project to explain approaches to technology. 
Just as a lack of economic literacy restricted the discipline prior to the emergence of IPE, the 
lack of technological literacy is having a similar effect by hampering efforts to move beyond 
existing paradigms which largely address industrial rather than information technology. 
Understanding how to incorporate new technologies like the internet into international 
relations theory is increasingly being recognised as an important research project (Mayer-
Schöenberger and Brodnig 2001, Rosenau and Singh 2002, Weiss 2005, Eriksson and 
Giacomello 2006). 
One solution to this theoretical impediment can be found within the discipline of the 
philosophy of technology. Primarily concerned with the interaction of technology with every 
aspect of the human experience, the philosophy of technology articulates a range of 
“approaches” which frame our understanding of and response to technology. Each of these 
approaches leads to a methodological framework. This study finds that two of these 
approaches dominate current international relations literature but it is in fact the third 
approach which can help to expand the breadth and depth of studies dealing with power and 
new technology. 
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The following brief introduction to the philosophy of technology will lay a foundation 
for the application of central concepts and approaches which can be observed and integrated 
into international relations literature. The second section of this chapter identifies two 
dominant paradigms within international relations for understanding the relationship between 
technology and power. These paradigms are comprised of self consciously articulated theories 
of power coupled with (generally) unself-conscious but clearly evident approaches to 
technology. Neither of these two paradigms is proving consistently effective for understanding 
the relationship between power and technology in the information age as they either remain 
embedded in industrial age concepts and theories or they fail to effectively engage with 
complex technical issues. Finally, this chapter will explain how the application of the third 
approach – the social construction of technology – can be applied to the study of the political 
history of the internet in the United States to better understand the complex relationship 
between power and new technology. 
Philosophy of Technology 
The emergence of the philosophy of technology as a discipline was a response to rapid 
changes in technology and science. Prior to the industrial revolution, the pace of change was 
not generally sufficient to radically affect the wider social fabric during the course of an 
individual’s lifetime. However, the past two centuries have been a time of fairly constant, rapid 
and profound technological development. This has lead to what Norman Vig calls “a 
dominant paradigm of adaptation to changing technology” (Vig 1988). Attempts to better 
comprehend the impact of technology on the human condition have emerged as a coherent 
study now referred to as the philosophy of technology.  
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The philosophy of technology asks questions like “how does technology impact upon 
social structures?”, “how and why do social groups seek to shape technology?”, “does 
technology follow a pre-ordained developmental path?”, and “if so, are we powerless to stop 
it?”. These questions have as much relevance in the context of information technology as they 
did to industrial technology. Indeed, it is these questions and others like them which need to 
be applied to international relations literature attempting to understand issues of the complex 
relationship between power and technology. Instead, much of the literature addressing these 
issues remains tied to paradigms developed within the context of industrial technology and 
specially suited to those issues which arise from it. The philosophy of technology can provide a 
conceptual bridge for moving beyond those paradigms. 
Within the philosophy of technology, there are a range of approaches which have been 
articulated by a number of scholars. Although the nomenclature may differ, the concepts are 
relatively stable across the discipline. This paper adopts the definitions offered by Norman Vig 
of instrumentalism, technological determinism and social construction (Vig 1988). These three 
“approaches” to technology will later be linked to existing international relations literature 
demonstrating the prevalence of instrumentalism and technological determinism and 
explaining why the social construction of technology provides a means of arriving at new 
questions and answers to the problem of power and technology. 
Approaches to Studying Technology 
The approach referred to as instrumentalism regards technology is a means to 
address a human-defined problem or need. In this approach, technology is morally neutral and 
disconnected from its social consequences. Dominant in the commercial sector, 
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instrumentalism justifies continuous innovation while also implying that if there were to arise 
any negative social outcomes, the answer to them probably lies in a technologically based 
solution.  
In studying two concepts of a fundamentally social nature like power and the internet, 
an approach which disengages from the social is not appropriate. In this study, an instrumental 
approach would lead to questions about whether the design is “good” – that is, does it address 
the problem or purpose it was intended for? Is it being used for its intended purpose and is 
that purpose socially acceptable? Interesting though they are, these questions fail to engage with 
the profound impact of the internet which goes far beyond its originally intended purpose and 
it also makes it difficult or impossible to engage with changing perceptions of American power. 
Technological determinism (or autonomous technology, as it is sometimes referred 
to) is a social view of technology, however it is based on a mono-directional relationship. That 
is, technology has an impact on society – in many cases, a profound impact – but it is an 
external force over which society has minimal control or influence. It is the story of 
Frankenstein, of technology running along a predetermined evolutionary path which may or 
may not be beneficial for society but which is largely unstoppable. A determinist approach 
certainly does not see technology as “value neutral”. Rather, it is regarded as imbued with 
values like a desire for power, the quest for efficiency, and the profit motive – “over other 
human needs (including those of future generations) and against the integrity of nature” (Vig 
1988: 17). The fear of technological determinists is that once large systems are in place, it 
becomes very difficult to alter or reverse them – they become so embedded in society that they 
are not necessarily respondent to changed human perceptions about their value or use. In this 
context, an elite group of “technocrats” control what Lewis Mumford called the 
6 
“megamachine” leaving the rest of society vulnerable to its effects (Mumford 1967). This view 
negates social choice – it does not take into account the many decisions which societies do 
make about how they will develop and use technology. Technological determinism could 
provide a methodological framework for one half of this study. If the research aim were simply 
to examine the impact of internet technology on political ideas of US power, this approach 
may have been adequate. However, it is irreconcilable with an epistemological position of 
constructivism which underpins the other half of the research aims – how ideas of US power 
have shaped and influenced the development of the internet. An essential starting point for 
this study is that states do make decisions about how they believe the internet should best 
promote their national interest and enhance state power but technological determinism would 
refute that claim. 
Problems of the previous views led some scholars, particularly historians and 
sociologists, to adopt a new approach – the social construction of technology (SCOT)1.  For 
these scholars, technology is not a neutral instrument for problem solving nor a value laden 
force which threatens human autonomy. Rather, it is an expression of social, political, and 
cultural values. Vig writes that “decisions about which technologies are developed and who 
benefits from them are shaped more by cultural preferences and the distribution of financial 
and political power than by specific problems or technical opportunities” (Vig 1988: 15). The 
social construction of technology rejects the premise that a particular technology succeeds 
simply because it was “superior” to other competing options. Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker 
                                                 
1 As this chapter is adopting the nomenclature of Norman Vig, this approach should perhaps be referred to as “Contextualism” 
which is his term. However, for consistency with the rest of the paper, it will be referred to here as the social construction of 
technology. The two terms are interchangeable. 
7 
illustrate this theme through a sociological history of the development of the bicycle, citing a 
range of social, judicial and moral influences which combined with the application of science 
to favour certain bicycle models over others (Pinch and Bijker 1989: 17–50). Superiority, of 
course, is a subjective term and dependent upon the articulation of stated priorities. In addition 
– and particularly relevant for the internet – adoption changes technology. Those who use it, 
improve, exploit, adapt and shape technology. In this process, priorities and the means by 
which success is measured may change. Therefore, SCOT argues that the emergence of any 
new technology needs to be understood in the context of social and political forces at work 
which influence choices and preferences.  
A SCOT approach to technology leads to questions such as, how are technological 
priorities ordered and by whom? What happens to technology when those priorities are 
altered? And, fundamentally for this project, what role do ideas play in this process of shaping 
technology?   
In the next part of this chapter, these approaches will be contextualised within the 
frameworks for understanding power and technology which currently exist in international 
relations. By merging these two conceptual fields, it becomes apparent that international 
relations literature is dominated by paradigms which adhere most closely to either 
instrumentalism or technological determinism and that the introduction of SCOT may provide 
a theoretical bridge for moving beyond the existing stalemate in the literature. 
Existing Frameworks in International Relations 
Understanding power in international relations is an ongoing and unresolved academic 
project. A key shift in recent years has seen scholars more comprehensively explore the social 
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aspects of power as opposed to the previously dominant theoretical view which regarded 
power more narrowly defined as material. In part, this shift has been necessitated by key 
systemic changes within the international system as a consequence of globalisation and the 
conclusion of the Cold War. Recent developments in information and communications 
technology have played an important role, however the relationship between power and new 
technologies remains under-theorised. 
The following section of this chapter will demonstrate how ideas about power have 
changed over time but that understandings of its relationship with technology have remained 
remarkably stable despite the recent introduction of very different technology. This would 
pose no problem if the theory retained its explanatory capability, however there are compelling 
reasons to argue that it does not. The first section, entitled “The Industrial Age: Technology 
and National Power” brings together realist notions of power and an instrumental approach to 
technology which (largely) dominated international relations literature from the second world 
war to the late 1980s and (for some) the early 1990s. As noted earlier, a key characteristic of 
instrumentalism is a view of technology as a morally neutral means to an end. This approach 
dovetails with political ideas of the state as morally neutral, compelled to survive in a self-help 
system by any means necessary. The second section entitled “The Information Age: 
Technology and Social Power” brings together the changes in approaches to power which 
have emerged largely since the conclusion of the Cold War, with the information revolution. 
Much of the literature in this section is characterised by a technologically determinist view 
which (often due to insufficient technical knowledge) tends to regard new technologies as 
value laden and autonomous. This view aligns more comfortably with ideas about American 
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power which emphasise moral responsibility not only to its constituents, but to a broader 
global community as well.  
Through a discussion of the dominant frameworks extant within international relations 
literature, this section will elucidate the problems with each view thereby justifying the 
adoption of a new framework for examining these issues. Essentially, these two competing 
frameworks arrive at a stalemate based on an unquantifiable question. Does new technology 
enhance state power more than it undermines it? This project argues that it does both and 
therefore, it would be more useful to ask some different and more enlightening questions. 
Those questions include how do states influence the emergence and management of new technologies to 
address their national interest? How does technology itself, influence perceptions about state power? And what 
role do ideas play in the political shaping of social technology? These questions cannot be asked or 
answered within the two paradigms which currently dominate international relations theory. 
The first does not engage with technology as a social construct and the second does not fully 
account for the political influence and shaping of technology. A social construction of 
technology methodology which focuses on these very issues, will consequently prove more 
useful. 
The Industrial Age: Technology and National Power 
The healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national security. (Bush 2003: 1) 
For much of the twentieth century, scholars of international relations have approached 
the relationship between power and technology in a relatively stable and consistent manner.2 
                                                 
2 Within realist thought, there are a range of views on how power should be defined, ie. whether as a means to an end or an 
end in itself. This paper will not provide a comprehensive catalogue of variations in realist approaches to power. It is 
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Through the dominant lens of realist theory which views the state as a self-interested, power-
maximising unit in an anarchical system, technology has been regarded as a constitutive 
element of state power. Its military and economic relevance has made technology a mechanism 
through which power (or security) seeking states pursue relative advantage by the development 
of more efficient production methods (economic power) as well as advanced weaponry 
(military power) (Morgenthau 1978: 322). Having explained something of the philosophy of 
technology and instrumentalism, it is possible now to explain how that scholarship intersects 
with realist power theory to produce what is referred to here as the “nation-state” approach to 
the relationship between power and technology in international relations. 
Realist power theory argues that power must be narrowly perceived as material 
capabilities due to their relative importance in determining the outcome of conflict and also 
their quantifiable nature. The realist adherence to this view of power coupled with neo-
realism’s emphasis on system structure underpinned the importance of technology as (despite 
the acknowledgement of other factors), material capabilities continued to be viewed as the 
most important and decisive element in ordering the system structure. Indeed, the 20th century 
witnessed a growing emphasis on technology as material capability while other more 
conventional resources such as population and territory came to be regarded by some as 
diminishing in relevance. Employing a Fordist approach, Alastair Buchan wrote of the decline 
of territory and population as a form of power with emphasis instead placed on states’ 
technical and scientific base. In his view, “power, influence, or prestige can now be increased 
                                                                                                                                                    
concerned here only with understandings of the relationship between technology and power in international relations and as 
such is proposing two broad conceptual approaches – the first of which – the nation-state power view, is most closely 
associated with a broadly realist approach.  
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by the better organization of existing domestic resources and the application of science and 
technology to them” (Buchan 1972: 177).  
A material view of power sits comfortably with an instrumental view of technology – 
indeed, they complement one another. The combination of an instrumental view of technology 
as a value-free tool employed to achieve the ends of a state with only one moral objective – 
survival – results in the “nation-state” approach to the relationship between power and 
technology. In this framework, technology is a mechanism to enhance state power and thereby 
has implications for world order. 
Despite more recent theoretical and empirical challenges, the nation state view 
continues to resonate in contemporary international affairs as states persistently attach a high 
value to advanced technology as it relates to state power. By continuing to regard ICT as an 
artefact like other forms of industrial technology, the vulnerabilities which come hand in hand 
with the rapid integration of ICT into contemporary state affairs are surmountable. States 
simply need more – more ICT capabilities, more rapid advances in the development of these 
technologies and more doctrine for their application. This perspective resonates with the 
instrumental approach which regards technology as morally neutral and able to address 
negative social consequences of technology with a “techfix”. In this context, militaries the 
world over are rapidly developing “information warfare” or “cyberwar” capabilities. The US 
Department of Defense now views information as a “realm, a weapon, and a target of warfare” 
(Wilson 2006: 1). Information and communication in the nation-state view becomes a 
commodity to be weaponized in the same way that previous industrial-age technologies were. 
There is a general sense that ICT is becoming a significant factor in conflicts and that militaries 
need to adapt and be prepared to project state power throughout this new sphere. Thus 
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dominance in “cyberspace” is equated with dominance in other international commons such as 
space or sea lanes (Tanji 2007).  
However, operationalizing these capabilities in a conventional conflict situation 
remains difficult. Under both domestic and international law, responding to aggression with 
reciprocal force over the internet is highly problematic. The determination of what constitutes 
the use of force in the context of a cyber-attack remains unclear – one of the key problems 
highlighted in 2007 when Estonia turned unsuccessfully to NATO for help while undergoing a 
massive cyber attack (Grove, Goodman and Lukasik 2000). Although ICT has certainly been 
applied to enhance existing warfare technologies, regarding information and communication 
technology simply as another commodity fails to acknowledge its distinct nature and the 
complexities of operationalizing it in the context of state to state conflict.  
While a material view of power and technology may have been useful in understanding 
the dynamics at work in conventional conflicts, ICT lends itself to unconventional conflict 
characterised by anonymity, geographical dislocation, low ranking actors on par with states and 
the interdependence of industrialised states on a vulnerable global network. Just as nuclear 
technology prompted a shift from wars of destruction to a strategy of deterrence, ICT is being 
understood more clearly as a technology of “disruption” (Demchak 2003, Shimeall, Williams 
and Dunlevy 2001). The impact of disruption is at the heart of a key paradox of ICT – states 
which have been most successful in adopting new information age technologies are also most 
vulnerable to disruption (Christensen 1999, Markoff 1991). This is the central 
power/technology paradox which the nation-state approach is unable to address. 
While new technologies have certainly had a positive impact on existing industries and 
security, the theoretical challenge to international relations has been the emergence of 
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fundamentally social rather than industrial technologies. Unlike the early part of the twentieth 
century which was characterised by a strong realist practice and fundamentally industrial 
technology, the latter decades saw a growth in a theoretical reassessment of power coupled 
with the emergence of revolutionary social technology. The relationship between social 
technology and concepts of political institutions like power and sovereignty appear to be 
distinct from those of industrial technology. Not surprisingly, theories predominantly 
concerned with material power have not easily synthesized emerging social technology. To date, 
more ideationally inclined theoretical frameworks have generally been used to examine the 
relationship between new technology and power and it is to these that this paper turns next.  
The Information Age: Technology and Social Power 
The realpolitik of the new era is cyberpolitik, in which the actors are no longer just states, and raw power can be 
countered or fortified by information power ( Rothkopf  1998: 326). 
From the beginning of the 90s, applications for ICT expanded exponentially. Simon 
Rogerson and Terrell Ward Bynum (1995) describe computer technology as “the most 
powerful and most flexible technology ever devised”. Access to the internet rapidly moved 
from a small band of academic and military clients in the mid 1980s into the public domain. In 
a very short space of time, ICT has become ubiquitous in advanced industrial states and 
integral to the delivery of essential public services including national security. Newly 
industrialised and industrialising states regard ICT as a mechanism to “leapfrog” generations of 
technological development and move more quickly towards modernisation and 
competitiveness in the international system. In addition to the innumerable applications of ICT 
to enhance essentially industrial technology, the social aspect of ICT has impacted significantly 
on civil, economic and political relations. Coinciding with the advent of social technology was 
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a theoretical shift in international relations scholarship to considering issues of power as 
socially constituted rather than primarily material.  
The combination of these factors contributed to the emergence of the second 
dominant paradigm for understanding the relationship between power and technology in 
international relations – referred to here as the “information-age” approach. This approach 
encompasses a lot of the theoretical shifts which have arisen to challenge realism, material 
power and the immutability of the state. In addition, it often exhibits a determinist approach to 
technology – one which regards technology as imbued with values (democratisation, freedom 
of speech and transparency of government or conversely, invasive surveillance and lack of 
personal privacy). It generally regards the internet as anarchical, user driven and beyond the 
dominance of the state. Essentially, this is a view characterised by change and re-evaluation of 
power in which ICT more broadly is frequently cited as a catalyst or even the driving force for 
those changes. This view engages with new technology and generally regards it as breaking 
down old power structures by redefining both the players and the playing field of international 
relations. However, it often does so without engaging adequately with technical issues leading 
to utopian or dystopian readings – dependent largely upon the perception of which values – 
positive or negative, reside in internet technology. 
Two broad questions have preoccupied the academic debate addressing these issues. 
First, scholars have worked to understand how technological change has impacted on power 
relations between individuals and the state (or the idea of the state) (Smith and Naim 2000, 
Drezner and Farrell 2004, Slaughter 2004) and second, what implications those changes have 
for conceptual approaches to state power (Nye 2002, Aronson 2002, Hachigian 2002). Many 
studies have concentrated on the manner in which social technology has impacted on state 
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power by eroding or undermining the institution of sovereignty. The general emphasis in these 
debates is that social technology is dissipating power from the state in a variety of ways. 
Prominent among these is the proliferation and organisation of non-state actors which 
compete for power with states and the challenges of state control over extra-territorial issues 
which stem from interconnected networked systems (Castells 2000, Langman 2005).  
A dominant concern for theorists of social power is legitimacy (Lebow 2005). Through 
an analysis of the US neo-conservative approach to power, Christian Reus-Smit (2004) 
concludes that social capital is an integral element of political power and effective influence 
relies on social legitimation. Although a social view of power can be understood independently 
of technology – either old or new – social technology has significant relevance for issues of 
legitimacy, “soft power” and other social aspects of power in international relations. A 24 hour 
news cycle, unrestricted access to satellite footage, and the rapid dissemination of information 
and images have intensified awareness of state behaviour and made it much more difficult for 
states to conceal events detrimental to their international standing. As demonstrated by the 
mobile phone generated images of torture inside Guantanamo Bay and the Wikileaks release of 
diplomatic cables, states have difficulty escaping surveillance even in the most remote and 
guarded situations. Thus, intersubjective relations between states are heightened by social 
technology and outcomes are difficult to subvert to capabilities in this context.  
For these scholars, changing ideas about power and emerging technology combine to 
bring about a substantially changed system, transforming from one comprised simply of states 
to one comprised of multiple and diverse actors (Nye 2002: 60). In this new system, states are 
relinquishing or losing control with obvious implications for the relationship between 
technology and power.  
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While these studies make a significant contribution, they do contain impediments to a 
richer understanding of how new technology interacts with power. In explicating the manner 
in which state power is undermined by new technology, this literature frequently fails to make 
informed distinctions between aspects of the technology which are the consequence of state 
decisions and those which are beyond the immediate control of states. Of particular relevance 
here is Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wacjman’s observation that technological determinism 
“focuses our minds on how to adapt to technological change, not on how to shape it. It 
removes a vital aspect of how we live from the sphere of public discussion, choice and politics” 
(MacKenzie and Wacjman 1999: 5). This leads to a focus on “adaptation” which has been a 
dominant feature in recent work attempting to understand political change in the context of 
the internet. Although there are some intractable technical issues which pose real challenges to 
state power, there are no natural or scientific laws which make it imperative that the internet 
function in the way it does. By failing to make accurate distinctions between what states 
choose and what they have imposed upon them, this “information age” view relies upon a 
technologically determinist approach. 
Both the industrial age approach and the information age approach are able to 
contribute to understanding the relationship of ICT to power in international relations. 
However, although technology infrastructure and the use of ICT applications to enhance 
industrial power are significant, the complexities of state responses to social technologies such 
as the internet necessitate a broader approach which moves beyond 20th century 
conceptualisations of power in the international system. A social view, which places the role of 
information, culture, identity and knowledge at the centre of its analysis, is able to engage with 
the more complex and compelling issues. Despite this better conceptual fit, the polarising 
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debates within this literature about whether ICT enhances or diminishes state power coupled 
with the prevalence of a technologically determinist approach also place limits on theoretical 
development. 
The Social Construction of Technology 
Having introduced the basic premise of the social construction of technology (SCOT) 
in part one of this chapter and having demonstrated that existing approaches to the 
relationship between technology and power in international relations literature are failing to 
accommodate new social technologies like the internet in part two, the third part of this 
chapter will explain in some detail how a SCOT methodology can be applied to the study of 
the relationship between power and technology in international relations.  
The social construction of technology is fundamentally about looking beyond the 
impact of a particular technology on society in order to understand how society itself shaped 
the evolution and adoption of that technology. The following four concepts are essential to 
understanding and employing a social construction of technology methodology and they also 
provide a means of conveying how this methodology can be implemented in a study such as 
this one. 
“Interpretive flexibility” refers to the understanding that there were alternatives to the 
design of a particular technology (Pinch and Bijker 1989: 40). In other words, there was no 
natural law or predetermined outcome for a technological development. Rather, the manner in 
which it was perceived and responded to played a role in shaping it. Interpretive flexibility is 
linked to priorities and allows for an analysis of how changes to priorities may influence both 
how technology is interpreted and how it continues to evolve in a design sense.  
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In the context of internet technology as it relates to ideas about US power, interpretive 
flexibility is a key concept in understanding how changing political circumstances have 
impacted upon the technological evolution of the internet. Over the course of its development, 
there have been a number of unintended consequences – both positive and negative – of 
internet technology. Questions about how these second and third order consequences have 
been perceived politically leads to insight into values and priorities held externally to the 
technology itself – values and priorities which interact with technology but are not a direct 
product of it.  
A second key concept is that of “closure”. Pinch and Bijker define closure in 
technology as “the stabilisation of an artefact and the “disappearance” of problems (Pinch and 
Bijker 1989: 44). In other words, it is not necessary to “solve” problems – rather closure relies 
on key social groups regarding the technology as stabilised. A particular technology then, may 
achieve closure through social rather than technological means by redefining the problem or 
through the transfer of power to a social group which disregards that problem. Closure is a 
social construct and is a significant factor in understanding the relationship between 
technology and the human condition. 
Understanding how US politicians regard the resolution of a range of “problems” with 
the internet is essential to an analysis of its relationship to US power. In a SCOT approach, 
problems with the internet exist only if the relevant social actor believes they do. Some 
problems may be tolerated because of the advantages they provide or because immediate 
solutions would transgress other firmly held beliefs or values. This is illustrated by the range of 
state approaches to censorship on the internet – something which is regarded as inappropriate 
in the United States where values of freedom of speech and access to information are highly 
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valued social norms. Other problems arising from the internet may pose difficulties for some 
actors but not others. For example, credit card transactions over the internet favour banks 
over vendors but collective apprehension about the (in)security of banks reinforces that 
problem. Finally, closure can be achieved by redefining the problem – an approach which proves 
relevant in an examination of changing American strategic priorities and views of power.  
A third SCOT concept of relevance to this study is the “reverse salient”. Thomas 
Hughes (1989: 73) defines a reverse salient as “components in the system which have fallen 
behind”. They create lag and are often considered points of weakness which must be 
addressed before the system as a whole can effectively develop. Reverse salients are of 
particular significance to a large technical system like the internet and Hughes suggests that 
they can often be points of innovation. However, when reverse salients cannot be corrected 
within an existing system, they can lead to the evolution of a competing system (Hughes 1989: 
75). This concept underlines the notion that systems are not pre-determined to either success 
or survival.  
Reverse salients are important to this study because they can help to identify issues 
which are understood to impact negatively upon US power and help explain responses to 
those perceived weaknesses. This will lead to questions in the study about how US politicians 
understood reverse salients in the context of internet technology and how those perceived 
reverse salients translated into policy and legislative responses. There is nothing naturally 
definable about reverse salients. Rather, they are a product of priorities and perceived goals 
and as such, they can reveal much about the views of the social group – far beyond the 
technology to which they relate. 
20 
One final concept which will be integral to the methodology of this project is that of 
the “relevant social group”. SCOT deals with the subjective and as such it is necessary to be 
clear about the source of subjectivity. Some SCOT studies focus predominantly on this issue – 
seeking to ascertain who exactly the relevant social group is and how it influences and shapes 
technology. In some cases, the relevant social group is found to be other than that which was 
expected or anticipated in which case this variable leads to insightful findings. 
However, in this study the relevant social group has already been defined as US 
political decision makers. While the study acknowledges that there are a wide range of social 
groups who have influenced and shaped the internet in profound and important ways, this 
particular social group is considered here to be both highly relevant and under-researched. In 
studies of the internet there is a tendency to define the relevant social group as either the 
broader community, the commercial sector or the technical community (which is generally 
understood to privilege the best interests of the other two groups). This project is an attempt 
to bring the state back in to these debates. In order to research the manner in which ideas 
about US power influence internet technology, this study will focus on those ideas which 
emanate from the state apparatus through policy documents, key speeches, legislature. 
In an attempt to move beyond the previously articulated competing paradigms, this 
project proposes a deeper engagement with the relationship between new technology and power. 
Rather than assess these issues exclusively through a determination of the positive or negative 
effects of technology, this study asserts that the internet both enhances and undermines state 
power in complex and important ways. The SCOT concepts discussed above generate a set of 
questions which move beyond the conceptual and empirical stalemate of whether ICT 
enhances state power more than it undermines it or vice versa. Asserting that there is nothing 
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determined or fixed about either of these outcomes, it moves on to more enlightening 
questions about how political ideas and technology interact.  
Criticisms of SCOT include the assertion that it reduces technology to simply another 
form of cultural expression, along with art and literature. Also, as Vig points out, the “chain of 
causation between social context and technology is difficult to establish” (Vig 1988:16). 
However, the first criticism is only an issue for those studies which are primarily concerned 
with the development of technology. This study is not compromised by an understanding of 
technology as a form of cultural expression – indeed, such a reading is fundamental to the 
conceptual framework here. Second, causation is difficult to establish but this study does not 
assert that ideas of power caused the internet to develop in the way it has. Rather, it seeks to 
better understand the relationship between ideas of US power and internet technology in an 
intersubjective manner. Ultimately, this project takes the position that a meaningful 
understanding of technology cannot be achieved in abstraction from its human context.  
The empirical research for this project is underway through the following case studies. 
Each of these periods brought with it a range of technical and political factors which interacted 
to shape internet technology and these are currently being examined using a SCOT 
methodology. 
Case Study One – Developing it: TCP/IP and the Expansion of the Internet 
(1960s to early 1980s) 
Established in 1958 in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) was charged with ensuring the US maintain a leading role in the 
application of state of the art technology to military capability. With a view to connecting large 
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computer systems in order to maximise their capabilities, ARPA began to fund and support 
work on networking protocols both from within its own research institute and also through 
funded association with key computer scientists working in academia. As work progressed, 
more specific applications were conceptualised including the establishment of a secure 
communications system necessary to enhance the United States’ second strike capability in the 
event of nuclear attack. Although there were alternatives (Clark 1988), the technology adopted 
in response to ARPA’s requirements was the “transmission control protocol/internet protocol” 
– or TCP/IP – the foundational technology of the internet developed by Vinton Cerf and 
Robert Kahn.  
Superficially, the development and implementation of TCP/IP technology to address 
ARPA’s priority of providing a more robust communications system can be understood within 
the paradigm of nation-state power. However, throughout this design phase, security of the 
network and accountability appear to have been low priorities - possibly due to the fact that 
access was restricted to defense, science and academia. TCP/IP was conceptualised from the 
beginning as an open and flexible architecture which ultimately provides a rich environment 
for both innovation and exploitation. Given that the code prioritises redundancy and flexibility 
over security and accountability, how did ARPA and US policy makers conceptualise the 
impact on American power of making the internet globally available? How did ideas and 
expectations about the future direction of American power coalesce with the internet 
transforming from a communication system designed to protect and enhance US military 
capability to a global system open to the ideas, innovations and requirements of a broader 
community? 
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Case Study Two – Expanding it: Commercialising the Web 
(mid 1980s to late 1990s) 
The second research phase for this project covers the mid 1980s to the end of 1990s. 
During this period, the internet was commercialised and became widely accessible. Initially 
distinguished by the rapid growth in email traffic, the defining technological development of 
this phase was arguably the emergence of HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and 
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and their application to the development of the world 
wide web largely credited to British physicist Tim Berners-Lee. The subsequent 
commercialisation of web browsers which provided a user-friendly graphical interface was 
instrumental in the widespread take-up of internet technology. This period covers the “dot-
com” economic boom and bust, transformation of news media and developing notions of the 
democratising potential of the internet. The rapid escalation in use of the internet during these 
years brought the US face to face with difficult decisions about whether or how to loosen their 
grip on controlling factors such as the assignment of names and numbers, the development of 
a legal framework which balanced freedom of speech and privacy of the individual with 
national security issues, the encryption debate, and how to manage the global spread of the 
physical infrastructure of the internet.  
The political context for these decisions was distinct from that of the first phase 
discussed previously. With the Cold War over, small government was in and economic power 
was coming to be regarded as an increasingly significant aspect of foreign policy strength. 
President George H. Bush’s foreign policy doctrine was premised on a “new world order” 
which projected a period of peace and stability founded upon the predominance of liberalism, 
free markets and the rule of international law. The Clinton administration followed up by 
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emphasising American global economic leadership based on free markets and projection of an 
enlargement policy which promoted democratisation and human rights. The dominant political 
paradigm of liberalism, free market force and minimising government provided an ideological 
platform for US decisions to disallow any state led governance structure for controlling the 
internet during this critical period of growth. Former vice-president Al Gore was a key political 
force during this period introducing the High Performance Computing and Communication Act of 
1991 while still a senator during the Bush Administration. The passing of this bill had a 
number of important affects on the development of internet technology including the funding 
of the first commercial web browser, Mosaic and the establishment of the National 
Information Infrastructure (NII). Significantly, the NII was legislative acknowledgement of a 
view which would become increasingly important in emerging ideas of state power and its 
relationship to new technology – the notion of information as a form of state power.  
These views largely resonated with prevailing ideas of US power. The emphasis on less 
government left the internet to govern itself, market forces would ultimately prevail and result 
in a healthy and stable system, the internet could have a democratising effect similar to 
economic factors and the positive economic impact of the IT boom reinforced the mutual and 
symbiotic benefit of this approach. However, the problems of security and accountability 
across the network were both increasingly apparent and intractable. The economic bubble was 
about to burst, and state to state conflict was about to be overtaken by wars of asymmetry and 
disruption. How had the decisions taken during this stage prepared the United States for the 
problems to emerge in the new millennium? To what extent were ideas about the relationship 
between US power and new technology dependent upon the positive outcomes of the 1980s 
and 90s? How were these ideas challenged, reinforced and/or amended during the years to 
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follow? And how would changing ideas about American power influence the way internet 
technologies further developed, especially in terms of geopolitical security issues and 
international codes of conduct? 
Case Study Three – Controlling it: The Changing Role of the ISP 
(the previous decade) 
The third period covered in this study looks at changes to ideas about US power and 
technology since 2001. The foreign policy doctrine of George W. Bush was initially conceived 
in terms of a selective and discriminate national interest to be pursued through enhanced 
military capability. This doctrine was comprehensively articulated in a Foreign Affairs journal 
article written by US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice (2000) and by US Secretary for 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001). However, post 
911 this was significantly reworked with the new strategic framework fundamentally based 
upon a more expansive view of the American national interest which now faced a range of 
emergent globalised threats less responsive to conventional military power (Jervis 2003, 
Rumsfeld 2006). Changing conceptions of conflict, the role of non-state actors, the doctrine of 
pre-emption, high-tech versus low-tech, asymmetry and the erosion of some aspects of 
geopolitics have all came to the fore in this phase. Changing ideas about US power have had 
significant implications for changing conceptions of the internet - from a system largely driven 
by fundamental tenants of economics and democracy to one more focused on the 
vulnerabilities of misuse and disruption. 
In the political context of the “war on terror” which subverts conventional sources of 
power and elevates social power, the internet takes on new meaning. The rapid migration of 
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information systems connected to the internet during the course of the late 1980s and 90s 
made internet commentator John Perry Barlow’s insistence that “you of the past leave us alone” 
(1996) less tenable now that 1.5 billion people or 23.5% of the world’s population are now 
online - as well as 85% of US critical infrastructure (Internet World Stats 2008, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2004). Some of the previously acknowledged vulnerabilities of the internet 
have enhanced relevance in an era marked by unconventional threats from determined 
individuals. The growing realisation that universal software platforms like Microsoft Windows 
and the Office suite are highly vulnerable - particularly when coupled with the open 
architecture of the internet - highlighted a range of possible threats to the state (Geer et al 
2003). The cross jurisdictional nature of cyber-crime which may be committed from a state 
with laws divergent from the state in which the crime actually occurs, greatly complicates the 
exercise of power (Krebs 2007). Certainly, one of the distinguishing features of the internet is 
that it remains difficult to moderate behaviour through conventional institutions and regimes 
such as state or international law. Given that some unintended or unanticipated consequences 
arise from the adoption and implementation of new technology, how has the United States 
responded and how have changing ideas about US power influenced this phase of internet 
development? 
In some ways, the original military approach to the internet which drove development 
in the 1960s and 1970s has risen again to prominence during this period. The Department of 
Defense has increasingly focused on cyberwar or infowar strategies and doctrine, largely 
through a dedicated unit within the Airforce which now regards domination of airspace to 
include cyberspace. A US congressional report published in 2006 notes however, that 
reciprocating against a cyber attack may lead to “possible accusations of war crimes if offensive 
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military cyber-weapons severely disrupt critical civilian computer systems, or the systems of 
other non-combatant nations.” The report concludes that the US Department of Defense 
believes that it lacks “sufficient policy and legal analysis for guiding appropriate responses to 
intrusions or attacks on DoD networks.” (Wilson 2006: 5). Increasingly, the United States 
faces a “strategic paradox” whereby it is forced to balance the often contradictory computer 
security requirements of its economy with military strategies which increasingly involve the 
capacity to disrupt the infrastructures of rival nations (Rathmell 2003). Additionally, cyber-
espionage has become a significant issue with many allegations directed against China – 
arguably America’s key strategic challenger. With the expected democratising effect of the 
internet still to eventuate, the US has instead focused attention on China’s use of the internet 
as a weapon and as a tool of suppression – notably the US Congressional hearing into Yahoo 
over the divulgence of the contact details of a Chinese journalist charged with revealing state 
secrets (Kahn 2005, Marquand 2005). This takes place in the context not of the closed system 
of ARPAnet, but rather in a globally accessible and open network which necessitates a 
modified approach to that employed during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Changing ideas about American power impact on conceptions of the internet and in 
this phase, the disruptive capacity of the technology has increased resonance leading to a “re-
militarised” view of the internet. This re-conceptualisation allows for a range of policy 
discussions which would have been difficult during the previous phase including those 
surrounding the need to rebalance the security/privacy aspect of the internet (R. Mueller 2007, 
Singel 2008). It also leads to a paradox. How does the US reconcile a re-militarised approach to 
the internet with suggestions that internet challenges are not particularly responsive to military 
power? How has the re-conceptualisation of US power influenced the progressive 
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development of internet technology since 2001? How has the United States sought to 
minimised internet vulnerabilities in the context of an expanded view of the US national 
interest? How has the national security community responded to and influenced changing 
perceptions about the internet? And finally, what future consequences for state power does the 
US anticipate in relation to the internet?  
Conclusion 
In summary, then, this chapter proposes that a more engaged and conscious approach 
to technology needs to be integrated with international relations theories of power in order to 
better understand the relationship between power and technology. In attempting to move 
beyond the debate in international relations about whether new technology like the internet 
enhances state power more than it undermines it, the philosophy of technology provides a 
conceptual framework for better understanding the intricacies of the relationship between the 
political and technological realms. Specifically, the social construction of technology allows for 
the analysis of the ways in which states seeks to shape and influence emerging technology and 
also the manner in which changing technology can impact on political ideas. This leads away 
from a simple quantitative equation to a more complex reading of how political processes are 
affected by and also impact upon the evolution and implementation of new technology like the 
internet. Ignoring this complexity can lead to an over-simplification of important issues and 
questions. Asking and answering these questions is essential to the development of theories 
equipped to deal with the relationship between power and technology in the information age. 
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